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1 McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 558 (Ct. App. 2009).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 558–59.
4 Id. at 559.
5 Id. at 564.
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INTRODUCTION
When Tootsie, a two-year-old Maltese dog, was diagnosed
with a respiratory disorder requiring corrective surgery, her
owner desperately feared for the safety and well-being of her
beloved pet.1 The veterinarian advised the dog’s owner of the
risks associated with such a procedure and the importance of
withholding all food and water for twenty-four hours following
surgery.2 Contrary to her own instructions, the veterinarian
proceeded to feed Tootsie a food mixture merely two hours after
the surgery, causing Tootsie to aspirate the mixture into her
lungs, and ultimately resulting in her premature death.3 When
Tootsie’s owner was informed of this tragedy, the veterinarian
attempted to conceal the fact that it was her own negligence that
caused Tootsie’s death.4 Due to the current state of the law in
California, the court refused to award any type of emotional
distress damages to sufficiently compensate Tootsie’s owner for
the negligent killing of her precious dog, leaving her with nothing
but heartache.5
Tootsie’s owner is only one of many individuals who are
forced to endure the loss of man’s best friend without any
compensation to acknowledge the emotional impact of such a
tragic event. In Carbasho v. Musulin, a West Virginia Supreme
Court decision, a woman who witnessed the death of her pet dog
was only permitted to recover the dog’s fair market value after he
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was struck and killed by a negligently driven vehicle while the
two of them were taking a walk.6 It is the unfortunate reality
that the vast majority of individuals who suffer the loss of a pet
must undergo severe pain and suffering without receiving
compensation for their emotional distress. In fact, the majority of
courts refuse to allow plaintiffs to recover non-economic
emotional distress damages arising from the injury to or death of
a companion animal; rather, the judiciary is stuck in an
antiquated mode of viewing animals as if they were any other
form of inanimate personal property, limiting recovery to their
fair market value.7
Although the role that companion animals play in American
society has been gradually transitioning away from mere
property and is becoming more akin to that of a family member,
the judiciary has failed to keep pace with this change.8
Today, 63% of all American households have one pet, 45% have more
than one. In fact, there are more pets in America than there are
citizens (360 million pets, 290 million people). Americans will spend
upwards of $36 billion pampering those pets this year, an amount
nearly equal to the amount Americans spend on toys and candy
combined . . . . Beyond question, many Americans love their cats, their
dogs, their birds, as well as they love their children. But like the
children of the pre-industrial revolution, the [judiciary] chooses to
categorize those pets as nothing more than chattel.9
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6 Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 371 (W. Va. 2005) (“[D]ogs are personal
property and damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are
not recoverable for the negligently inflicted death of a dog.”).
7 Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss
of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion Animal,
4 ANIMAL L. 33, 50 (1998).
8 Sabrina DeFabritiis, Barking up the Wrong Tree: Companion Animals, Emotional
Damages and the Judiciary’s Failure to Keep Pace, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 237, 245 (2012).
9 Carbasho, 618 S.E.2d at 372 (Starcher, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
10 Id.
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What were once treated as items of personal property, used solely
for economic purposes, are now providing societal benefits to
humans, such as companionship, affection, and emotional
fulfillment. Despite judicial recognition of such a significant
change, courts continue to label companion animals as personal
property, thereby prohibiting plaintiffs from recovering
emotional distress damages when they are forced to grieve the
loss of a pet.10 The unconditional love and companionship that
pet owners derive from their furry friends creates an emotional
dependence that persists even after the animal’s death, just as it
would upon the death of a family member, and this relationship
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Id.
See, e.g., Hendrickson v. Tender Care Animal Hosp. Corp., 312 P.3d 52, 54–55
(Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (recognizing human-animal bond, but refusing to award emotional
distress damages for the negligent death or injury to a pet).
13 See Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985)
(stating that the court is willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for the intentional killing of a pet); Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1278
(Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs are entitled to recover emotional distress
damages for the intentional killing of their pet donkey); Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806,
809–12 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (recognizing the court’s ability to award emotional distress
damages when defendant sold plaintiff’s pet horses to a slaughterhouse without her
knowledge).
14 Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 600–03 (Ct. App. 2012).
11
12
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should be afforded better recognition by the law.11 One of the
most crucial roles of the judiciary is to adapt to society’s changing
attitudes and to formulate remedies that account for such
changes. Nevertheless, while courts have acknowledged the
emotional bond that often exists in the relationships between
people and their pets, the current state of the law fails to
adequately address this change, leaving many aggrieved
plaintiffs without a legal remedy.12
While courts have historically refused to recognize the
recovery of emotional distress damages associated with the
injury to or death of a companion animal, some states have
recently begun to recognize a plaintiff’s ability to recover
non-economic damages as a result of the intentional injury to a
companion animal.13 Among these states is California, which
recently held in Plotnik v. Meihaus that “a person’s intentional
injuring or killing a pet will support recovery of damages for
intentional infliction of emotional distress,” reasoning that the
strong emotional connection that exists between a human and a
companion animal indicates that recovery for emotional distress
damages is warranted in particular situations.14 Although courts
are certainly taking steps in the right direction, limiting the
potential recovery of emotional distress damages to cases
involving intentional conduct leaves countless plaintiffs, such as
Tootsie’s aggrieved owner, without a sufficient remedy. This
Comment will address the need for expanding California’s
recognition of non-economic emotional distress damages to
include recovery for the loss of a companion animal due to the
negligent conduct of another.
Although California has allowed for the recovery of
emotional distress damages when a pet has been intentionally
injured or killed, this rule should similarly apply to the negligent
injuring or killing of a companion animal. A plaintiff may recover
under a theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress in
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15 See, e.g., Stump v. Ashland, Inc., 499 S.E.2d 41, 52 (W. Va. 1997) (allowing claim
of negligent infliction of emotional distress after truck crashed into house resulting in
homeowners’ deaths).
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certain situations involving the death or injury of a family
member;15 however, California has refused to find a defendant
liable for this cause of action when the case involves negligent
conduct towards an animal. While it is concededly true that the
loss of a family member is likely to result in greater hardship
than the loss of a companion animal, it is virtually undisputed
that the death of a pet is considered to be a traumatic event that
will also lead to significant emotional devastation. Due to the
analogous nature of these relationships based upon the grief that
accompanies either loss, such protection should be granted in the
latter situation as well as the former. The state’s failure to adapt
to modern views regarding companion animals leaves numerous
plaintiffs without an adequate remedy when they suffer the loss
of their beloved pet. Courts have repeatedly acknowledged the
special relationship that often exists between humans and
companion animals, yet there have been no efforts to alter the
law to provide a sufficient remedy when this relationship has
been destroyed in situations involving negligence. Moreover,
emotional distress damages are compensatory in nature, and
thus serve to make the plaintiff whole in cases where a person
has been the victim of another’s wrongful conduct. As such,
whether a person’s conduct is intentional or negligent should be
irrelevant when awarding emotional distress damages. In making
this determination, the focus should be on the plaintiff’s recovery
rather than the defendant’s actions.
In this Comment, Part I will address the history of the
classification of nonhuman animals as property, and will discuss
the enactment of statutes and judicial interpretations concerning
the recovery of damages for the loss or destruction of personal
property. Part II will discuss the current state of the law
pertaining to the availability of emotional distress damages,
particularly in California, and how states have applied these
damage awards to cases involving the negligent harm to a
companion animal. Finally, Part III will identify the issues
associated with the lack of recognition of such damages and will
propose a solution by suggesting that California allow a plaintiff
to recover emotional distress damages for the negligent, as well
as the intentional, injury to or death of a companion animal.
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I. ANIMALS AS PROPERTY AND AVAILABLE DAMAGES
Historically, and still to this day, all animals have been
considered the personal property of humans.16 As a result, when
a person suffered the loss of a companion animal, the available
damages were initially limited to the fair market value of the
animal.17 Due to the tragic nature of such an event and the
emotional suffering that often accompanies the loss, courts began
to recognize that this limited remedial scheme was vastly
insufficient. In an effort to adequately compensate these
individuals, many courts now allow additional damages to be
recovered, including medical expenses and, in some cases,
emotional distress damages.18 While California has recently
expanded the availability of emotional distress damages for the
loss of a companion animal, many plaintiffs are still left without
a sufficient remedy, resulting in the need for further expansion.19
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16 David Favre, Living Property: A New Status for Animals Within the Legal System,
93 MARQ. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2010).
17 William C. Root, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member? An Examination
of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable
for Their Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 423–24 (2002).
18 See Leith v. Frost, 899 N.E.2d 635, 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (modifying trial court
judgment to award damages in the amount that plaintiffs paid in veterinarian bills,
rather than fair market value); see also Gill, 695 P.2d at 1278 (awarding emotional
distress damages for intentional killing of pet).
19 Plotnik, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 603–04.
20 Favre, supra note 16, at 1025.
21 Id. at 1026.
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A. Animals as Personal Property
The emerging debate between scholars and animal rights
advocates over the proper classification of animals has led to
many changes in the way both society and the legal system view
companion animals. Ranging from civil liability to criminal
prosecution, the law’s treatment of injury to or death of a
companion animal has been drastically altered in recent years,
and continues to change. While animal rights have significantly
increased over the past few centuries, the continuing classification
of animals as personal property has left countless animals and
their human counterparts without a proper avenue for relief.
There currently exist three basic categories of property
recognized in the American legal system—real property, personal
property, and intellectual property.20 Personal property is
“physical, moveable, and has a limited physical existence,” and as
such, animals have historically fallen under this broad
classification.21 Some scholars believe that the justification for
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the legal status of animals as property is based both in theology,
and on the inferior status of nonhuman animals.22 This type of
classification has resulted in both procedural and substantive
hurdles for animals and their advocates, such as the inability of
an animal to sue on its own behalf, the denial of rights and
privileges that are afforded to humans, and of course, a plaintiff’s
inability to recover damages for the wrongful death or injury of a
pet.23 These concerns have prompted a series of arguments
urging for a change in the legal classification of animals as
property. While some scholars argue that a fourth category of
property should be created to accommodate for the unique
characteristics possessed by animals, others advocate for a
change in their property status altogether, arguing that animals
should be afforded the status of “legal personhood.”24
In his article entitled The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman
Animals, Steven Wise, President of the Center for the Expansion
of Fundamental Rights in Boston, argues that although the “legal
thinghood” of animals is derived primarily from ancient law and
primitive legal systems, when legal rules no longer reflect
current values, such rules must be reconsidered.25 He addresses
the fact that the earliest examples of law clearly demonstrate
legal ownership of nonhuman animals, but that these theories of
law were founded upon notions of “divine power” as opposed to
justice.26 Modern legal theory, he argues, has essentially replaced
this method of law, and requires a consideration of normative
principles and scientific discoveries that have since been

05/09/2016 12:16:02
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22 Derek W. St. Pierre, The Transition from Property to People: The Road to the
Recognition of Rights for Non-human Animals, 9 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 255, 261 (1998)
(“The first has a theological basis, established in the Bible. In Genesis, man is given
‘dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle, and
over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creeps upon the earth.’ A second
justification rests in the ‘inferior’ status of non-human animals. Historically, non-human
animals were viewed as lacking a ‘soul,’ a ‘mind,’ a ‘will,’ or whatever attribute it was
thought makes humans uniquely human.”).
23 BRUCE A. WAGMAN ET AL., ANIMAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 51 (4th ed. 2010).
24 Steven Wise, The Legal Thinghood of Nonhuman Animals, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
R EV . 471, 472 (1996); see also C AROL B. M ATLACK , W E ’ VE G OT F EELINGS
TOO!: PRESENTING THE SENTIENT PROPERTY SOLUTION passim (Barbara K. Lawing
& April Turner eds., 2006) (arguing for a new category of property referred to as “sentient
property”); Favre, supra note 16, at 1021–22 (arguing for a new category of property
referred to as “living property”); Susan J. Hankin, Not a Living Room Sofa: Changing the
Legal Status of Companion Animals, 4 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 314, 379 (2007)
(arguing for a new category of property referred to as “companion animal property”).
25 Wise, supra note 24, at 473–74. “As every legal rule has its unique history, an
understanding of this history is instrumental in the reconsideration to which every legal
rule eventually becomes subjected.” Id. at 474.
26 Id. at 543.
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Id. at 543–44.
Id. at 475.
29 Id. at 545–46.
30 See generally Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for
Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (2007); Carter Dillard, Empathy with Animals: A
Litmus Test for Legal Personhood? 19 ANIMAL L. 1 (2012); Christopher D. Seps, Note,
Animal Law Evolution: Treating Pets as Persons in Tort and Custody Disputes, 2010
U. ILL. L. REV. 1339.
31 WAGMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 74.
32 Favre, supra note 16, at 1028.
33 Frequently Asked Questions, ASPCA, http://www.aspca.org/about-us/faq/how-manyaspcas-are-there [http://perma.cc/6BHZ-KZ36].
34 WAGMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 91–92.
35 Animal Legal & Historical Center, MICH. ST. U., https://www.animallaw.info/
statutes/us/california?page=2 [http://perma.cc/7UH9-P2BW].
27
28
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founded.27 Due to the fact that the foundations of ancient laws
are no longer applicable and have been fundamentally destroyed,
the application of these laws “violates modern notions of
fundamental principles of justice.”28 Wise argues that “scientific
discovery has created new views of life and of nature and
decisively undermined the hierarchical cosmologies that once
underpinned the transcendence of human over nonhuman
animals,” and as such, “legal values, principles, and rights are
not inherently limited to human beings, but entitle at least some
nonhuman animals to transcend their historical legal thinghood
and to draw equally upon these sources for legal
personhood . . . .”29
Notwithstanding the numerous scholars who are in support
of this view,30 the harsh reality is that animals continue to be
classified as personal property and are treated as such with
respect to the law. Nevertheless, while these animals are
considered to be the personal property of humans in all fifty
states,31 many changes have taken place to accommodate for the
previously mentioned hardships that this classification places on
animals. In 1867, Henry Bergh founded the first American
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (“ASPCA”) in
New York, which was aimed at promoting the interests of
animals in being free from unnecessary pain and suffering.32
Since that time, hundreds of local humane societies have been
established across the country in an attempt to advocate for an
increase in animal rights.33 Additionally, every state has adopted
its own anti-cruelty laws designed to prevent the mistreatment of
animals, and as of 2009, forty-six states and the District of
Columbia had at least one felony anti-cruelty law.34 Specifically,
California has enacted more than 100 statutes pertaining to the
treatment of animals.35 Among these is California Penal Code
section 597, enacted in 1872 and aimed at preventing cruelty to
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CAL. PENAL CODE § 597 (West 2016).
People v. Baniqued, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 835, 840–41 (Ct. App. 2000).
38 State v. Nix, 283 P.3d 442, 449 (Or. Ct. App. 2012), vacated, 345 P.3d 416
(Or. 2015) (“[T]he individual animal identified in each count of second-degree animal
neglect for which defendant was found guilty qualified as a separate victim . . . .”).
39 Id. at 443.
40 Id. at 449.
41 Id. at 446–48.
42 State v. Nix, 345 P.3d 416, 424 (Or. 2015).
36
37

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 163 Side B

animals, which states that “every person who maliciously and
intentionally maims, mutilates, tortures, or wounds a living
animal, or maliciously and intentionally kills an animal, is guilty
of a crime,”36 and defines an animal as “every dumb creature.”37
Furthermore, in 2012, the Oregon Court of Appeals issued a
ruling in State v. Nix that classified nonhuman animals as
“victims” for the purpose of prosecuting under Oregon anti-cruelty
statutes, essentially expanding the recognition of animal rights in
the state.38 In Nix, the defendant was found to be in possession of
dozens of emaciated horses and goats and was ultimately
convicted of twenty counts of second-degree animal abuse.39 The
court held that even though the animals were still considered to
be the personal property of the defendant, each of the twenty
neglected farm animals was a separate victim.40 In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that “none of the provisions upon
which defendant relies . . . expressly or implicitly provides that
the victim of a violation of the animal neglect statutes is a
person” and that “even though animals usually are the property
of persons, there is a broader public interest in their health, care,
and well-being that requires vindication when they are
neglected.”41 However, on March 5, 2015, the Supreme Court of
Oregon vacated this landmark decision for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that the State did not have authority to appeal the
misdemeanor judgment and, as a result, both the court of appeals
and the supreme court lacked judicial power to issue opinions.42
Although the decision has been vacated, the court’s rationale in
issuing such a ruling indicates its willingness to expand animal
rights and potentially recognize that animals should be classified
as more than mere property.
While there has been a significant increase in the recognition
of animal rights and interests on both the statutory and
institutional level, there still exists a large concern associated
with the ability of plaintiffs to recover emotional distress
damages for the loss of their pet. These concerns are primarily
due to a companion animal’s continued legal status as property.
Although courts have recognized that the distinct nature of an
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animal necessitates the creation of rules to acknowledge its
unique status,43 the ability to recover non-economic damages in
situations where an animal has been intentionally or negligently
killed or injured is still severely lacking.
B.
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43 See Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 633 (Vt. 1997) (“[M]odern courts have
recognized that pets generally do not fit neatly within traditional property law
principles. . . . Instead, courts must fashion and apply rules that recognize their unique
status.”).
44 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 424 (2001).
45 Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-economic Damages in Pet
Litigation: The Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 227, 230 (2006).
46 23 CAL. JURISPRUDENCE 3D DAMAGES § 69 (2015).
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Recovery for Damage to Personal Property
While an individual who suffers the loss of a companion
animal may generally recover the fair market value of the
animal, this nominal value is clearly insufficient when
considering the overall purpose of civil recovery. Legal remedies
are designed to compensate a plaintiff for the defendant’s
wrongful conduct; in determining the type of compensation that
should be awarded, it is crucial to look at the nature of the injury
and provide compensation that will make the plaintiff whole. In
many cases involving injury to a companion animal, however, a
plaintiff is not made whole absent an award of emotional distress
damages.
In a lawsuit involving tortious conduct, there are two general
types of damages that a plaintiff may be able to recover: punitive
damages and compensatory damages. The United States
Supreme Court has defined punitive damages as “private fines
intended to punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing,”
whereas compensatory damages “redress the concrete loss that
the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant’s wrongful
conduct.”44 In other words, compensatory damages are generally
thought of as those that serve to make the plaintiff whole, and
include both economic and non-economic damages. While
economic damages “compensate plaintiffs for tangible injuries”
and often refer to measurable amounts such as lost earnings or
medical expenses, non-economic damages “compensate plaintiffs
for intangible injuries such as pain and suffering, loss of
companionship, and emotional distress.”45
In lawsuits arising from the loss or destruction of personal
property, California has generally limited the measure of
damages to the fair market value of the property at the time of
the loss or destruction,46 refusing to allow the recovery of
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non-economic damages in such cases. Due to an animal’s
property classification, courts have historically extended this
limitation to situations where an animal has been the victim of
intentional or negligent injury or death.47 However, several
states, including California, now recognize that “[p]ets are no
longer exclusively treated as property with regard to damages”
and have consequently expanded the available recovery in such
lawsuits.48 Indeed, California’s state legislature has acknowledged
the availability of additional damages in animal-related lawsuits
by codifying this change in California Civil Code section 3340,
which states that: “[f]or wrongful injuries to animals being
subjects of property, committed willfully or by gross negligence,
in disregard of humanity, exemplary damages may be given.”49
Although this type of allowance has commonly referred to the
recovery of punitive damages in cases involving intentional
injury,50 or an award of economic damages, such as reasonable
medical expenses relating to the injury or death of the animal,
very recently courts have begun awarding non-economic
damages, such as damages for emotional distress.51 In doing so,
courts have focused on the property’s actual and intrinsic value
and the injury to the plaintiff, stating that “harm may be caused
to a person’s emotional well-being by malicious injury to that
person’s pet as personal property,” but continuing to acknowledge
that damages for sentimental value are not recoverable.52 As a
result, many states have started to take a step in the right
direction by allowing the recovery of additional damages when a
person’s pet has been injured or killed.
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47 See, e.g., Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (App. Div. 2001) (dismissing
plaintiff’s claim for emotional distress damages based upon negligent or malicious killing
of dog because of its property classification); Goodby v. Vetpharm, Inc., 974 A.2d 1269,
1274 (Vt. 2009) (holding that the measure of damages for death of pet cats was fair
market value prior to death less fair market value after death).
48 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION, CACI No. 3903O (2016).
49 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3340 (West 2016).
50 Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (finding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in awarding $75,000 in punitive damages).
51 See Martinez v. Robledo, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 921, 927 (Ct. App. 2012) (stating that
an injured pet owner’s recovery of costs incurred in treatment and care is an appropriate
measure of damages); Kimes v. Grosser, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 581, 586 (Ct. App. 2011)
(allowing plaintiff to present bills incurred to save pet cat in recovering reasonable and
necessary costs); see also Womack v. Von Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for emotional distress damages).
52 Womack, 135 P.3d at 546.
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II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Every state has recognized that nonhuman animals possess
sentient traits and qualities that inherently distinguish them
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from other forms of property. As a result, courts are now
changing their approach when confronted with cases involving an
injury to an animal, and often will treat companion animals as
more than mere property by allowing their owners to receive
additional forms of compensation. Some states, including
Washington,53
Kentucky,54
Alaska,55
Idaho,56
Florida,57
58
59
Louisiana, and Connecticut, have already acknowledged the
availability of emotional distress damages based on the
intentional injury to a companion animal. Until 2012, California
had refused to make such a determination, limiting the available
remedies in cases involving the injury to or death of an animal to
economic damages.60 In a landmark decision, however, the
California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District changed the
state’s view and held that a person who intentionally kills or
injures an animal may be liable for emotional distress damages.61
Plotnik v. Meihaus: A Landmark Change in California Law
In 2003, plaintiffs David and Joyce Plotnik moved into a
home with their two children and their miniature pinscher dog,
Romeo, next door to the Meihaus family.62 In the six years
following their move, the plaintiffs and the defendant, John
Meihaus, Jr., developed a hostile relationship consisting of
countless adverse encounters between the two families.63 This
relationship came to an end on April 9, 2009, when Romeo ran
into the Meihaus’ backyard after hearing a loud banging noise
coming from their property.64 After his dog began barking, David
Plotnik heard a loud squeal and subsequently saw Romeo rolling
down the slope of the yard.65 When Mr. Plotnik entered the
Meihaus’ yard, Mr. Meihaus was holding a bat, shouting at Mr.
Plotnik “to be more courteous and get [his] dogs to stop
A.
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See id.
See Burgess, 44 S.W.3d at 812.
55 See Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985).
56 See Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
57 See La Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964).
58 See Brown v. Crocker, 139 So. 2d 779, 781 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
59 See Liotta v. Segur, No. CV020347756S, 2004 WL 728829, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Mar. 15, 2004).
60 See Kimes v. Grosser, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 581, 586 (Ct. App. 2011) (limiting
damages to fair market value when defendant shot and killed pet cat); McMahon v. Craig,
97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 565 (Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to award emotional distress damages
when veterinarian negligently killed pet dog).
61 Plotnik v. Meihaus, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 585, 603 (Ct. App. 2012).
62 Id. at 591–92.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 592.
65 Id.
53
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Id. at 593.
Id.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 600.
Id. (quoting Johnson v. McConnell, 22 P. 219, 220 (Cal. 1889)).
Id. at 599–601.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 598 (citing McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 564 (Ct. App. 2009)).
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barking.”66 Meihaus’ striking of Romeo caused the dog to have
difficulty walking, and ultimately required Romeo to undergo
surgery to repair his right rear leg.67
The court acknowledged the availability of an award for
emotional distress damages as a result of the defendant’s
conduct, holding that “California law allows a pet owner to
recover for mental suffering caused by another’s intentional act
that injures or kills his or her animal.”68 In doing so, the court
recognized that other states have acknowledged a pet owner’s
ability to “recover for mental suffering caused by another’s
wrongful acts resulting in the pet’s injury or death” and focused
on the strong attachment that may exist between a person and a
pet.69 The court quoted the 1889 California Supreme Court case
Johnson v. McConnell, noting that “there are no other domestic
animals to which the owner or his family can become more
strongly attached, or the loss of which will be more keenly felt.”70
In determining the award of damages, the court individually
addressed the plaintiffs’ separate causes of actions for trespass to
personal property, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Basing its decision on
the property status of the animal, the court found that the
defendant was liable for emotional distress damages under the
plaintiffs’ trespass claim.71 Consequently, the court refused to
allow additional emotional distress damages based on the claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, simply stating that
“[a]llowing recovery for the same conduct here would amount to
double recovery.”72
In denying the plaintiffs’ request for emotional distress
damages based on their negligence claim, the court adopted its
previous holding in McMahon v. Craig, which held that “a pet
owner could not recover damages for emotional distress or loss of
companionship based on a veterinarian’s negligent treatment
that resulted in a dog’s death.”73 However, Plotnik is easily
distinguishable from McMahon because the claim in McMahon
involved negligence in the veterinarian context, whereas the
injury in Plotnik involved the conduct of a neighbor. The court in
McMahon addressed the difficulty in creating a rule that imposes
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liability on veterinarians who have negligently injured or killed a
person’s pet as a result of medical treatment or care, stating that
such a rule would raise serious policy concerns pertaining to
increased insurance rates or decreased availability of
veterinarian care.74 Allowing the recovery for the negligent injury
to a pet outside of the context of veterinary care does not
implicate the same policy considerations and, therefore, should
have been afforded greater weight in the court’s analysis in
Plotnik. Nevertheless, the court’s decision to award the plaintiffs
emotional distress damages based on the defendant’s intentional
conduct demonstrates the affirmative steps that the judiciary is
taking to find a proper balance between an animal’s property
status and its emotional connection with humans in determining
the availability of damages in similar situations.
B.

(1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of
the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware
that it is causing injury to the victim and, (3) as a result suffers
emotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a
disinterested witness.76

76
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See McMahon, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 564.
Gu v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 617, 622 (Ct. App. 2005).
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 815 (Cal. 1989).
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The Lack of Recovery in Cases Involving Negligence
While many states, such as California, have unequivocally
determined that a plaintiff may recover emotional distress
damages for the intentional injuring or killing of a companion
animal, the recovery for cases involving a defendant’s negligent
conduct is still severely lacking. Based primarily on the level of
culpability in cases involving negligence and the absence of any
maliciousness or ill-will that often accompanies intentional acts,
courts have unanimously concluded that an individual may not
recover emotional distress damages for the injury to or death of a
pet. Nevertheless, California has recognized that a plaintiff may
recover emotional distress damages for cases involving
negligence in other contexts, and such recognition should be
expanded to include cases involving harm to companion animals.
The claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress is a
controversial cause of action that has been interpreted in a
variety of ways among the various states. The California
Supreme Court has analyzed this claim by reference to two
theories of recovery—the bystander theory and the direct victim
theory.75 Under the bystander theory, damages for emotional
distress are recoverable when the plaintiff:
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Id. at 829 n.10.
Gu, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 623.
See supra Section II.A.
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1067 (Haw. 1981).
Id. at 1066.
HAW. REV. STAT § 663-8.9 (West 2016).
WAGMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 201.
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The California Supreme Court has further elaborated on this
theory by stating that “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances,
recovery should be limited to relatives residing in the same
household, or parents, siblings, children, and grandparents of the
victim.”77 Due to the fact that a companion animal is generally
not considered to be a family member of a household, California
courts have never found negligent infliction of emotional distress
under the bystander theory in situations involving companion
animals. Under the direct victim theory, the California Supreme
Court has emphasized that a finding of negligent infliction of
emotional distress is fundamentally the same as the claim of
negligence, which requires the essential elements of duty, breach,
causation, and damages.78 Additionally, as was seen in the
Plotnik decision, courts may award emotional distress damages
based on any other tort claim, such as trespass to chattels, but
have rarely done so.79
Although no state currently allows an award of emotional
distress damages based on the negligent injury or death of an
animal, some states have acknowledged that this possibility may
in fact exist. In the 1981 case of Campbell v. Animal Quarantine
Station, the Supreme Court of Hawaii awarded emotional
distress damages when a plaintiff’s pet dog was negligently
killed during her transportation to a nearby hospital.80 The court
stated that “[w]here a claim for serious mental distress is made,
and the mental distress is inflicted when a person endures
negligently inflicted property damage, there is no requirement
that plaintiffs must actually witness the tortious event in order
to recover,” and awarded the plaintiffs $1000 in emotional
distress damages.81 However, five years later, Hawaii’s
legislature enacted a statute which barred recovery for emotional
distress arising from any type of property damage, effectively
rendering the court’s holding in Campbell invalid.82 The statute
was enacted as part of a tort reform effort triggered by a local
hurricane, when numerous plaintiffs sought emotional distress
damages arising from damage to their homes and belongings.83
Although Hawaii no longer permits such recovery, the court’s
analysis in Campbell provides useful insight into the possibility
of allowing emotional distress damages in future negligence cases
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Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1068.
McAdams v. Faulk, No. CA 01-1350, 2002 WL 700956, at *5 (Ark. Ct. App.
Apr. 24, 2002).
86 Knowles Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Willis, 360 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
87 Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 801 (Wis. 2001).
88 Id. at 802.
84
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involving damage to personal property. In reaching its holding,
the court relied on its previous ruling in Rodrigues v. State, in
which it permitted recovery for mental distress due to the
negligent destruction of the plaintiff’s home.84 By drawing this
comparison between a pet and a home, the court suggests that
these distinct types of personal property should be treated the
same. Of course, such an analysis would necessitate the concession
that animals are in fact property, but the benefits of allowing an
award of emotional distress damages based on this logic would
likely outweigh any negative implications attached to an animal’s
already established property classification.
Hawaii is not the only state that has acknowledged the
possibility of awarding emotional distress damages in negligence
cases involving injury to an animal. In McAdams v. Faulk, the
Arkansas Court of Appeals held that “[d]amages on a negligence
claim are not limited to economic loss damages, and include
compensation for mental anguish” and reversed the dismissal of
a case involving veterinary malpractice where the plaintiff’s
dog suffered a neck injury after the veterinarian’s office
inappropriately used a choke holder to quiet him.85 Additionally,
in Knowles Animal Hospital, Inc. v. Willis, the Florida Third
District Court of Appeal held that “the [lower] court did not
commit err by including for consideration of the jury the element
of the mental pain and suffering of the plaintiff-owners of the
dog” when a dog was negligently left on a heating pad following
its operation at a hospital, resulting in a severe burn and
disfigurement, and ultimately, his death.86 Moreover, in
determining whether the bystander theory of negligent infliction
of emotional distress applied in a case where the plaintiff’s dog
was shot and killed by a police officer, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin recognized that “humans form important emotional
connections that fall outside the class of spouse, parent, child,
grandparent, grandchild or sibling. . . . The emotional harm
occurring from witnessing the death or injury of an individual
who falls into one of these relationships is serious, compelling,
and warrants special recognition.”87 Nevertheless, the court
refused to award emotional distress damages in such a case
because allowing recovery would “enter a field that has no sensible
or just stopping point.”88 Courts have repeatedly acknowledged
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the existence of an emotional connection between companion
animals and their owners and have conceded that special
recognition should be afforded to such relationships, yet the law
has failed to provide for this recognition in cases involving the
negligent injury to or death of a pet. Due to the courts’
acknowledgement of such a bond, the next logical step towards
the expansion of civil recovery is the allowance of non-economic
damages in cases involving the negligent conduct of an
individual.

A. Bystander and Direct Victim Theory as Applied to Cases
Involving Companion Animals
The bystander theory of liability and direct victim theory of
liability can both be applied to cases involving the negligent
injury to or death of a companion animal. Due to the close
familial relationship that many people develop with their pets,
plaintiffs should be entitled to emotional distress damages when

91

See McMahon v. Craig, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 564 (Ct. App. 2009).
See Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 369 (W. Va. 2005).
See Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. 1974).
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III. ALLOWING NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN CLAIMS
INVOLVING NEGLIGENT CONDUCT
There are many situations where an individual’s pet may be
negligently injured or killed, such as cases involving veterinary
malpractice89 and negligence in driving a vehicle90 or allowing a
potentially dangerous dog to roam freely and harm other
animals.91 In each of these scenarios, the plaintiff loses a pet due
to the negligent actions of another, and is forced to suffer the loss
without just compensation. Although some states, including
California, have allowed the recovery of emotional distress
damages based on the intentional injuring or killing of a
companion animal, this recovery should similarly apply in cases
involving negligent conduct. The bystander and direct victim
theories that have been uniformly applied in analyzing claims for
negligent infliction of emotional distress should apply to cases
involving animals with equal force as with any other type of
negligent injury claim. Furthermore, the purpose of awarding
compensatory damages is to make the plaintiff whole, and
emotional distress damages should therefore be awarded in any
case where compensatory damages are required in order to
accomplish this purpose, regardless of whether the defendant’s
conduct was intentional or negligent.

C M
Y K

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 168 Side A

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

2016]

4/23/16 10:45 AM

Recovery for the Loss of a Companion Animal

675

they witness the death of or injury to their pet. Additionally,
there are countless situations where persons have a legal duty to
behave in a certain way and have breached that duty in causing
injury to an animal, subjecting them to liability for emotional
distress. Such duties include the duty to control an animal and
prevent it from harming another, the duty to act reasonably, and
the legal duty of veterinarians to their patients.
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Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829 n.10 (Cal. 1989).
See, e.g., Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (“The affection
an owner has for, and receives from, a beloved dog is undeniable.”).
94 Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 801 (Wis. 2001).
95 Id. at 807.
92
93
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1. Bystander Theory
In order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional
distress based on the bystander theory, California has
consistently held that a plaintiff must establish a direct
relationship with the victim, and that “no justification exists for
permitting recovery for [negligent infliction of emotional distress]
by persons who are only distantly related to the injury victim.”92
More and more frequently, courts are beginning to acknowledge
the significant relationship that develops between people and
their pets.93 As such, situations that provide for a remedy when a
plaintiff witnesses the negligent injury or death of a family
member should likewise apply to the witnessing of the negligent
injury or death of a companion animal. In Rabideau v. City of
Racine, which involved a police officer’s shooting of the plaintiff’s
pet dogs, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to recognize
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress because of
its inapplicability in the context of a “best friend who is
human.”94 The court held that “[f]or purposes of recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress, this court treats the
death of a dog the same as it treats injury to or death of a best
friend, a roommate, or a nonmarital partner: It allows no
recovery.”95 This rationale is without merit because a person’s
best friend or roommate has a separate family that could recover
for witnessing their death or injury. The animal’s only “family” in
such a situation would be the owner, and disallowing the owner
to recover for emotional distress would essentially render the
entire doctrine of bystander liability moot in such a situation. If
the pet’s owner is not permitted to recover damages after
witnessing a traumatic accident, the owner’s rights will not be
vindicated.
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96 Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Andell, J.,
concurring).
97 See Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr., 45 Cal. Rptr. 3d 222, 226–27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(“A plaintiff in a wrongful death action . . . may not recover for such things as grief or
sorrow attendant upon the death of a loved one, or for his sad emotions, or for the
sentimental value of the loss.”).
98 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CACI No. 3921 (2016); see
also Parsons v. Easton, 195 P. 419, 422 (Cal. 1921) (stating that there may be a pecuniary
loss to a parent from the death of a child arising from the deprivation of the comfort and
protection of the child).
99 Roos v. Loeser, 183 P. 204, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1919).
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When people adopt a companion animal and welcome the pet
into their home, they are manifesting a concrete addition to their
family and establishing a relationship that is vastly different
than a simple human-to-human friendship. In fact, many believe
that a dog’s relationship not only rises to the level of human
connection, it greatly surpasses that of a human. As Justice
Andell of the Texas Court of Appeals for the First District so
eloquently stated in his concurring opinion in Bueckner v. Hamel,
which involved the intentional shooting and killing of the
plaintiff’s pet Dalmatian and Australian Shepherd, dogs
“represent some of the best of human traits, including loyalty,
trust, courage, playfulness, and love. This cannot be said of
inanimate property. At the same time, dogs typically lack the
worst human traits, including avarice, apathy, pettiness, and
hatred.”96 Why else are they so often referred to as “man’s best
friend”?
In determining the availability of civil damages, family
members have been afforded similar remedies in the context of
other legal claims, such as actions involving wrongful death of a
child or spouse. In these cases, like cases involving the death of a
pet, a plaintiff may not recover emotional distress damages
involving sentimental values such as grief or sorrow.97 However,
in these types of wrongful death actions, courts may award
pecuniary damages for the loss of love, companionship, comfort,
care assistance, protection, and affection.98 Due to the fact that
California has recognized that dogs have comparable pecuniary
value that may be ascertained by reference to the dog’s
usefulness or other qualities,99 these pecuniary damages should
likewise be available in cases involving the death of an animal.
This comparison between the death of a family member and that
of a companion animal reflects California’s understanding that
these beings share many similar qualities and their loss is often
accompanied by analogous emotional devastation, thereby
indicating that an individual who suffers the loss of a pet should
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be afforded similar remedies as a person who suffers the loss of a
family member.
In Bueckner, the Texas Court of Appeals for the First
District specifically acknowledged this unique relationship by
noting some of the special characteristics possessed by
companion animals.100 In his concurring opinion, Justice Andell
stated: “Because of the characteristics of animals in general and
of domestic pets in particular, I consider them to belong to a
unique category of ‘property’ that neither statutory law nor case
law has yet recognized.”101 He goes on to suggest:
The law should reflect society’s recognition that animals are sentient
and emotive beings . . . . In doing so, courts should not hesitate to
acknowledge that a great number of people in this country today treat
their pets as family members. Indeed, for many people pets are the
only family members they have.102
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Bueckner, 886 S.W.2d at 377 (Andell, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 378.
Id.
Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 372 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
Id.
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He concludes his opinion with the proposition that “testimony
that an animal is a beloved companion should generally be
considered sufficient to justify a finding of damages well beyond
the market value of the animal . . . .”103
On a similar note, in his dissenting opinion in Carbasho, a
2005 West Virginia Supreme Court decision involving a plaintiff
who witnessed the death of her pet dog when he was struck by a
negligently driven vehicle, Justice Starcher suggested that the
law should be altered to conform with present ideals and values,
stating that “[w]hen the common law of the past is no longer in
harmony with the institutions or societal conditions of the
present, this Court is constitutionally empowered to adjust the
common law to current needs.”104 He critiqued the majority’s
decision by stating that they continue “to maintain the primitive
limits of the common law, and refuse[] to adjust to the realities of
the modern world, and permit recovery of damages for
sentimental value, mental suffering, or emotional distress.”105 It
is imperative that courts recognize their obligation to adjust the
law to adapt to modern perspectives and societal outlooks. Such
conformity requires a change in the way that courts approach
issues regarding companion animals, particularly in situations
where a plaintiff is forced to witness the injury to or death of a
beloved pet.
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106 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 807 (Cal. 1993) (“[T]here is
no duty to avoid negligently causing emotional distress to another, and . . . damages for
emotional distress are recoverable only if the defendant has breached some other
duty . . . .”).
107 Marshall v. Ranne, 511 S.W.2d 255, 259 (Tex. 1974).
108 Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co., 936 P.2d 70, 95 (Cal. 1997).
109 WAGMAN ET AL., supra note 23, at 215.
110 Id. at 219.
111 Williams v. Reynolds, 263 S.E.2d 853, 855 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
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2. Direct Victim Theory
In terms of the direct victim theory of liability, although the
California Supreme Court has implied that a plaintiff may not be
able to recover emotional distress damages for the negligent
injury of an animal simply because there is no duty that exists in
such a scenario,106 there are numerous cases where such a duty
does exist and is breached when the animal has been injured. For
example, in Marshall v. Ranne, a case involving a boar owned by
the defendant who attacked and injured the plaintiff, the Texas
Supreme Court stated that “a possessor of a non-vicious animal
may be subjected to liability for his negligent handling of such an
animal,” suggesting that a person has a duty to prevent a pet
from injuring another person, pet, or property.107 Moreover, the
California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is a general
rule of negligence that “every person has a duty to refrain from
acting in a manner that causes foreseeable injury to another.”108
Therefore, any situation in which a person is not acting as a
reasonably prudent person otherwise would act, such as
negligently operating a vehicle and striking a dog in the road,
would subject that person to liability for negligence. In these
cases, emotional distress damages would be required in order to
fully compensate plaintiffs for their losses.
Additionally, there exists a duty in veterinary malpractice
cases that could subject a veterinarian to liability for emotional
distress damages resulting from negligent conduct. In fact, the
vast majority of cases involving negligent injury to a companion
animal involve claims of veterinary malpractice.109 In medical
malpractice lawsuits, the duty of care that a physician owes
patients has traditionally been defined as the standard of
“learning, skill and ability which others similarly situated
ordinarily possess.”110 Courts have further elaborated on this
standard by defining “similarly situated” as “a standard of
professional competence and care customary in the field of
practice among practitioners in similar communities.”111 While
some states are in conflict regarding whether the same standard
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should be applied to veterinarians,112 California courts have
unanimously found that the medical malpractice standard
applies to veterinary malpractice cases.113 In doing so, courts
have looked to California statutes such as the California
Business & Professions Code, which categorizes both medical
doctors and veterinarians as licensed health care providers, and
the California Code of Civil Procedure, which treats both types of
cases the same for statute of limitations purposes.114 Thus, it is
clear that a duty exists in veterinary malpractice cases, and
when a veterinarian breaches this duty through negligent
conduct, he or she should be liable for emotional distress
damages to the aggrieved plaintiff under the direct victim theory
of liability.
B.
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112 Compare Gillette v. Tucker, 65 N.E. 865, 869 (Ohio 1902) (adopting a similar
malpractice analysis for all doctors, regardless of species), with Pruitt v. Box, 984 S.W.2d
709, 711 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the standard applicable to medical malpractice
should not be applied to veterinary malpractice cases).
113 See Williamson v. Prida, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868, 872 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that
the medical malpractice standard applies to veterinary malpractice cases).
114 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4800 (West 2016); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West
2016); CIV. PROC. § 597.5; see also Williamson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872 (relying on the
California Business and Professional Code and Civil Procedure Code in holding that
veterinarians and physicians are treated the same).
115 See Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985)
(“[T]he loss of a beloved pet can be especially distressing in egregious situations.”); La
Porte v. Associated Indeps., Inc., 163 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1964) (“[T]he affection of a
master for his dog is a very real thing and . . . the malicious destruction of the pet
provides an element of damage for which the owner should recover.”); Womack v. Von
Rardon, 135 P.3d 542, 546 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) (“[H]arm may be caused to a person’s
emotional well-being by malicious injury to that person’s pet as personal property.”).
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Emotional Distress Damages Serve to Make a Plaintiff Whole
As a form of compensatory damages, emotional distress
damages are awarded to compensate plaintiffs for any injury that
has wrongfully been inflicted upon them. In determining the
amount of damages to be awarded, the court must look at the
extent of the injury to the plaintiff as a result of the defendant’s
conduct. This is distinguishable from punitive damages, where
the court must look at the defendant’s conduct and determine
whether the conduct is so reprehensible as to warrant additional
damages for the purpose of punishing or deterring the defendant.
Accordingly, in cases where the court has considered emotional
distress damages based on the intentional injury to a pet, the
court focuses on the effect that the injury or death has had on the
plaintiff and the hardship that often accompanies such a loss.115
Due to the fact that courts place such a strong emphasis on the
effect of the action on plaintiffs, there should be no distinction
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Wise, supra note 7, at 50.
Id.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Thigpen, 788 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
(allowing emotional distress damages in case involving workplace harassment); Carey
v. Lovett, 622 A.2d 1279, 1294 (N.J. 1993) (awarding emotional distress damages to
parents in medical malpractice claim involving birth of daughter); Kennedy v. McKesson
Co., 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1344 (N.Y. 1983) (recognizing availability of emotional distress
damages in case involving dental malpractice).
116
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between intentional or negligent conduct by the defendant. In
either situation, the plaintiff is forced to endure the loss or injury
to a pet, and the way in which this injury has occurred should be
irrelevant. Of course, it would make no logical sense to award
punitive damages for negligent conduct, but emotional distress
damages serve a different purpose. Without emotional distress
damages in situations where a plaintiff’s pet has been
negligently harmed, the plaintiff is not provided an adequate
remedy. The focus in these cases must be on the plaintiff’s
recovery, not the defendant’s conduct.
It is generally thought that courts are reluctant to extend
compensatory damages to include those for emotional distress for
two primary reasons. First, emotional distress damages are
inherently difficult to prove or measure, and second, opening the
door to these types of emotional distress claims would invite a
floodgate of trivial or fictitious litigation.116 Some scholars have
further argued that emotional distress damages are so unique to
each individual that such damages are unforeseeable, and as
such, the defendant should not be held liable for injuries of this
sort.117 While it is certainly true that measuring emotional
distress damages is not a simple task involving a predetermined
formula, courts have uniformly permitted plaintiffs to recover
emotional distress damages in other contexts.118 In fact, though
limited in its application, the separate cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress has been consistently
recognized throughout the country. If courts are willing to permit
such recovery in these various situations, there should be no
reason to prevent recovery in the context involving the negligent
treatment of animals. The measure of pain and suffering
experienced by the plaintiff is still going to be a subjective test
based upon the plaintiff’s reaction to the defendant’s unlawful
conduct, and the underlying context therefore has no relevance.
Moreover, advances in medicine and science now allow for a
better attempt at measuring emotional distress damages to
determine with higher certainty the severity of such damages.
For example, expert testimony may be used to prove emotional
distress damages, such as long-term emotional trauma related to
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the defendant’s conduct.119 The issue of foreseeability is also moot
because medical science now recognizes that “in many situations,
a plethora of mental damages, including fright, shock, grief, and
anxiety, are foreseeable.”120
Furthermore, the simple fear that allowing plaintiffs to
recover emotional distress damages will result in a “Pandora’s
box” of litigation is not sufficient to prevent the award of
non-economic damages altogether. The current state of the law
disallowing emotional distress damages in situations involving
intentional or negligent injury to or death of an animal is
severely underinclusive and must be better adapted to provide
sufficient remedies for plaintiffs in these situations. It is
underinclusive in that countless claims involving obvious and
severe emotional distress have gone uncompensated and are
barred from recovery under this general rule, despite the clear
need for an additional remedy in order to make the plaintiff
whole.121 It is one of the general duties of the judiciary to
distinguish meritorious claims from frivolous ones, and a law
preventing the meritorious claims from being heard is
significantly more detrimental than the minimal burden of
weeding out those that lack merit.
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JON R. ABELE, EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: PROVING DAMAGES 110 (2003).
Wise, supra note 7, at 51.
121 Id.; see, e.g., Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (finding
that plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress but refusing to award emotional distress
damages); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 862 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (denying emotional
distress damages award despite plaintiffs’ severe emotional distress resulting in the death
of one of the plaintiffs).
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CONCLUSION
The relationship between humans and companion animals
has been undergoing tremendous development in recent history.
Although animals continue to be characterized as the personal
property of humans, the judicial and legislative branches have
become increasingly aware of the unique bond that is commonly
formed in such a relationship, and as a result, have altered the
way they have approached such situations to a limited extent.
California in particular has taken significant steps in recognizing
the importance of adjusting the way the law treats nonhuman
animals and their human counterparts, such as allowing an
owner to recover emotional distress damages when a pet has
been intentionally injured or killed. This significant decision was
a major breakthrough in the California legal system, which has
historically limited the available damages in such cases to
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economic damages. Nevertheless, the judiciary has failed to keep
pace with this evolving trend, and it is insufficient to end the
transition here, as this remedy does not take into account those
plaintiffs who have suffered the loss of a pet as a result of the
negligent actions of another. Regardless of whether the pet has
been harmed by another’s intentional or negligent actions, the
owner nonetheless must bear the loss, and as such, should be
afforded similar treatment when seeking a remedy.
Without sufficient compensation for the death or injury to a
companion animal in cases involving negligent conduct, plaintiffs
are being denied proper compensation and are never truly made
whole. It is an unfortunate tragedy that when a plaintiff suffers
the loss of a pet, that individual “has no remedy for . . . grief and
emotional distress in our common law.”122 By allowing plaintiffs
to recover emotional distress damages in situations where their
pet has been negligently killed or injured, California will be one
step closer to conforming the law to modern societal values.
Whether the allowance of emotional distress damages should be
permitted in claims involving damage to personal property,
incorporated into the concepts of direct victim liability or
bystander liability, or based upon an entirely separate cause of
action, this is a change that must take place in order to provide
pet owners with sufficient compensation under the law. To
illustrate the strong emotional bond that exists between a man
and his dog, Justice Starcher concluded his dissenting opinion in
Carbasho by quoting an old country song entitled “Old Shep.”
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Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d 368, 373 (W. Va. 2005) (Starcher, J., dissenting).
Id. at 372–73.
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With hands that were trembling
I picked up my gun
And aimed it at Shep’s faithful head
I just couldn’t do it
I wanted to run
I wish they would shoot me instead.
He came to my side
And looked up at me
And laid his old head on my knee
I had struck the best friend that man
[ever had
I cried so I scarcely could see.
Old Shep he has gone
Where the good doggies go
And no more with old Shep will I roam
But if dogs have a heaven
There’s one thing I know
Old Shep has a wonderful home.123
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When I was a lad
And old Shep was a pup
Over hills and meadows we’d stray
Just a boy and his dog
We were both full of fun
We grew up together that way.
I remember the time at the old swimmin’ hole
When I would have drowned beyond doubt
But old Shep was right there
To the rescue he came
He jumped in and then pulled me out.
As the years fast did roll
Old Shep he grew old
His eyes were fast growing dim
And one day the doctor looked at me and said
I can do no more for him Jim.

